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Abstract
We focused on how repeat collaborations in projects for inventions affect performance.
Repeat collaborations have two contradictory aspects. A positive aspect is team
development or experience, and a negative aspect is team degeneration or decline. Since
both contradicting phenomena are observed, inventors have a dilemma as to whether
they should keep collaborating in a team or not. The dilemma has not previously been
quantitatively analyzed.
We provide quantitative and extensive analyses of the dilemma in creative projects
by using patent data from Japan and the United States. We confirm three predictions
to quantitatively validate the existence of the dilemma. The first prediction is that the
greater the patent a team achieves, the longer the team will work together. The second
prediction is that the impact of consecutive patents decreases after a team makes a
remarkable invention, which is measured by the impact of patents. The third prediction
is that the expectation of impact with new teams is greater than that with the same
teams successful in the past. We find these predictions are validated in patents
published in Japan and the United States. On the basis of these three predictions, we
can quantitatively validate the dilemma in creative projects. We also propose preventive
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strategies for degeneration. One is developing technological diversity, and another is
developing inventor diversity in teams. We find the two strategies are both effective by
validating with the data.
Introduction
Our globally connected societies require us to be aware of competitiveness in various
levels, such as individuals, companies, or countries [1]. Knowledge creation has
attracted great interest as a way to be competitive instead of incorporating
labor-intensive processes that are typically observed in manufacturing [2–4]. Since the
central resource of knowledge creation is knowledge workers [5], it is important to know
how to support their activities. Although it is recognized that a genius could make
great creations [6], recent studies have indicated teams can generate better outcomes
than solo researchers on average [7]. Recent studies have also revealed a rising
propensity for teams rather than solo researchers [7–9]. If teams can perform better, our
next question is what qualities in teams affect performance.
Repeat collaborations seem to be a key to understanding how well teams work in
creative projects, and there is a growing field of study on repeat collaborations that
occur in creative projects. One reason for this interest is that repeat collaborations can
be understood as a process of coordination between creators. For example, Skilton and
Dooley indicated that there is a sequence of processes constituted by idea generation,
disclosure/advocacy, and convergence, which they call “creative abrasion” [10].
Through a survey of the studies on repeat collaborations, it seems the repeat
collaborations have two contradictory aspects. The first is positive: team development
or experience. Studies of team development using various models have described the
kinds of processes that allow team members to cultivate mutual relationships and
improved performance [11, 12]. These studies described in what kinds of processes team
members cultivated mutual relationships and improved performance. The second is
negative: team degeneration or decline. Previous studies have found that repeat
collaborations underperform in comparison with initial collaborations in creative
projects, e.g., scientific research [13–15], consulting practice [16], and performances in
entertainment [14,17–19].
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Repeat collaborations are particularly discussed in psychology. The terms “habitual
routines” or “behaviour of groups” are used to mean repeat collaborations. The first
review for habitual routines of groups seems to be given by Gersick and Hackman [20],
though they said the paper did not provide either a literature review or a theory of
habitual behavior but rather presented a broad-brush survey. The survey pointed out
that “habitual routines can reduce the likelihood of innovative performance processes.”
This contradiction is not just a theoretical conflict. The contradiction is
descriptively discussed in regard to innovation in companies in “The Innovator’s
Dilemma” [21]. This book, which contains numerous observed examples, explains how
new companies with disruptive technologies redefine competitiveness in markets, and
successful and preexisting companies cannot adjust themselves to changes because of
past successes. Companies with successful products are fixated on their successes and
end up ruined in the end. Although what we discuss is not the dilemma of companies
but rather individuals, they share the same basis.
In this paper, we investigate extensive and quantitative analyses of repeat
collaborations on patent applications by using data of Japan and the United States. In
particular, we define the dilemma as the phenomenon that a successful team is fixated
on repeat collaborations even if performance declines and members of the team lose the
chance for greater success in different teams. There have not been quantitative analyses
of this dilemma with creative projects.
The psychological studies, at their core, try to reveal the mechanisms behind repeat
collaborations. To the contrary, we intentionally avoid discussing the mechanisms
because we do not have detailed data such as on communication in teams. Also, the
difference between the psychological studies and our study can be attributed to data.
Their data is detailed but basically lab-scale. In comparison, our data is longitudinal
and wide-scope. The difference means the results complement each other.
It is in the nature of teams that they have routines because routines enable us to
exploit the knowledge and coordination within teams and avoid unnecessary costs in
rebuilding this knowledge or coordination. Therefore, how we can avoid the gradual
failure of performance during routines is a practical issue. Obviously, some stimuli are
necessary to avoid gradual failure. We consider introducing new technological fields into
teams and mixing team memberships as the stimuli and investigate the effect of the
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stimuli by our data. In particular, mixing team memberships has already been studied
in the psychology field [22,23].
The paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the data we use. Second, we
describe how we analyze the dilemma with patent data from Japan and the United
States and quantitatively demonstrate the dilemma of inventor teams. Third, we
propose strategies to prevent degeneration and explain how we validate the strategies on
the basis of data. Finally, we conclude the paper.
Data
Patent data is suitable for studying creative projects. This is because patents indicate
the occurrence of innovations over time [24]. Also, they contain massive data on
repeated collaborations. We use the Institute of Intellectual Property (IIP) patent
database to obtain the Japanese patent data [25], and the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) U.S. patent citations data and Patent Network Dataverse to obtain
the United States patent data [3, 26]. There is other patent data published by the
European Patent Office, which is called “PATSTAT”. We do not use PATSTAT because
inventors are not identified and much work is required to deal with it. Our approach
using massive data to help us analyze societies as complex systems, is in line with the
“computational social science” framework [27].
We can extract common data so that we can compare the two databases. The data
have the IDs of inventors who applied for patents, the number of received citations, the
technological classifications of patents, and the year of application. We use the
International Patent Class for Japanese patent data and the U.S. patent class for U.S.
patent data to get the technological classifications. To quantify the performance of
patents, we define the impact (I) of a patent by using the number of citations [3]. Since
older patents have more chances of being cited, impact is the number of citations
divided by the average number of citations of patents granted in the same year.
Here, teams are defined as assemblies of more than one individual. Even if a team is
a subset of another team, that team is considered to be a different team. For example,
if there is a sequence of patents applied for for patent 1 by inventors A and B and
patent 2 by inventors A, B, and C, we count two distinct first-patents as those of team
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A and B and team A, B, and C. Though team A and B is a subset of team A, B, and C,
those teams are considered as different teams. One may argue that the collaboration
between inventors A and B is not the first time at patent 2, and therefore, it is not
appropriate to count them as in a different team. This viewpoint may be correct. On
the other hand, it is doubtful that these two collaborations (without inventor C and
with inventor C) are the same team. Therefore, we here count a collaboration when a
setup of inventors is completely the same. In a later section, we will revisit this issue
and redefine how we count teams.
Table 1 summarizes fundamental data. The data show that there are enough patents
and citations between patents to statistically discuss the topics. Regarding the time
frame of the data, we use the maximum time frame provided by the databases because
longitudinal observation is necessary for our study.
Since we mainly discuss the impact of team inventions, it is worth checking their
distributions. Fig. 1 plots the cumulative probability distributions of team size on the
data. The vertical axis shows cumulative probability. The horizontal axis shows team
size. The red plots are for Japanese data, and the blue ones are for the U.S. data. The
lines are fitted to log-normal distributions by using maximum likelihood estimation.
The grayish red line is for Japan, and the grayish blue line is for the U.S. The lines
seem to fit well to the plots.
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 show the cumulative distributions of team size in the first and
second halves of the covered time periods, for the Japan and U.S. data, respectively.
The meanings of figures are the same as Fig. 1. As we can see, team sizes are growing
in both countries. The result is in line with the indications given by preceding
studies [7, 14].
Fig. 4 plots the impact distributions for the datasets. The meanings of the plots and
fitted lines are the same as those in Fig. 1. It is interesting that there are no large
deviations between datasets even if they are covered by different patent laws in their
countries. Regarding fitted lines, the U.S.’s distribution is well fitted by a log-normal
distribution. In comparison, the Japanese distribution is not fitted as well as the U.S.
one. Since the impact less than one is not frequently seen in Japan, it seems that the
absence causes the deviation of the fitted line for Japan. Detailed investigation into the
cause is beyond this paper, but we just add that this difference can happen since
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citation dynamics depend on the cultures of countries.
Table 1. Overview of datasets. Datasets used are Japanese (JP) and United States
patent data (US). Range of years in which patents were applied for is labeled “duration.”
In addition, table lists numbers of patents, inventors, teams, and citations.
Datasets JP US
Duration (year) 1964-2012 1975-2010
No. of patents 4,349,161 3,984,771
No. of inventors 1,538,525 2,665,7091
No. of teams 967,159 1,325,869
No. of citations 18,410,996 48,911,485
Figure 1. Cumulative probability distribution of team size. Horizontal axis shows
team size. Vertical axis shows cumulative probability. Lines are fitted to log-normal
distributions.
Quantitative demonstration of the dilemma
One of the goals in this paper, again, is to provide extensive and quantitative analyses
of the dilemma with creative activities. We explain how we find the dilemma in regard
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Figure 2. Cumulative probability distribution of team size in Japan. Horizontal axis
shows team size. Vertical axis shows cumulative probability. Data is separated around
middle of duration.
to creative activities.
A typical description of the dilemma is that a successful team tends to try to
reproduce the successes and members of the team, therefore losing chances to achieve
other successes in different teams. We propose three predictions to validate the dilemma.
• Prediction 1: The greater the patent a team achieves, the longer the team will
work together.
• Prediction 2: The impact of consecutive patents decreases after a team makes
great patents (hits).
• Prediction 3: At some point during consecutive patents, the expectation of impact
by switching teams is greater than that from consecutively working in the same
team.
Prediction 1 means that a team’s great patent (hit) tends to bind members for a long
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Figure 3. Cumulative probability distribution of team size in the U.S. Horizontal axis
shows team size. Vertical axis shows cumulative probability. Data is separated around
middle of duration.
time. Teams try to reproduce patents if they succeed, and vice versa. Prediction 2 has
already been reported in previous studies [14,15]. The opposite of Prediction 2 is that
there is no decrease or, instead, an increase in impact after hits. Prediction 3 means
that individuals in teams with past successes miss chances to produce better patents by
switching teams. If all of these three predictions are supported by the data, we can say
that the dilemma occurs.
Fig. 5 plots the average number of patents made by a team after it creates a patent
of a given impact. The impact of the first patent (the baseline patent) is shown on the
horizontal axis, while the vertical axis shows the average number of subsequent patents
by the same team. This average includes only the subsequent patents, not the baseline
patent. Note that every patent by a team is used once as a baseline, and the numbers of
subsequent patents for all baseline patents are counted.
We conduct linear regression analyses to validate whether or not it is true that the
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Figure 4. Cumulative probability distribution of impact. Horizontal axis shows impact.
Vertical axis shows cumulative probability. Lines are fitted to log-normal distributions.
greater the impact of a team’s patent, the more subsequent patents that the team will
produce. Though the relationships in Fig. 5 do not look linear, as long as we have
significantly positive results with the linear regression analyses, the results satisfy what
we need. We find both data have positive and significant coefficients for impact (Japan:
coefficient = 0.0042, p < 10−16; U.S.: coefficient = 0.032, p < 10−16). Therefore, the
better the impact is, the more patents the teams will have. The results satisfy
Prediction 1.
If the curves in Fig. 5 are concave, the probability of repeating a collaboration
increases as the impact of a baseline patent increases. In addition, the more concave the
curve is, the more sensitive the response is. Therefore, teams for Japanese patents tend
to have more subsequent patents, and the number is more sensitive to prior impacts
than that for the United States patents. To statistically test whether Japanese inventors
have more subsequent patents than U.S. inventors, we conduct Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.
The reason we choose the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is that the distributions of
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Figure 5. Average number of patents made by a team after it achieves a patent of a
given impact. Horizontal axis is the impact of baseline patent. Vertical axis is average
number of subsequent patents by same team. Brackets show standard errors. Horizontal
axis is cut so that number of samples is greater than approximately 100.
subsequent patents do not look like a normal distribution. The test is one-sided. For
every separate bin of impact in Fig. 5, we find subsequent Japanese patents are
dominant at the five percent level.
Fig. 6 plots the average impact of subsequent patents after hits. Here, we define hits
as patents with top 10% impact. The vertical axis is the average impact. The horizontal
axis shows a patent’s place within the sequence that includes the hit and subsequent
patents. The red line is for Japan, and the blue line is for the U.S. Those lines show
repetitions by teams whose membership did not change (“no switch”). As an overview
of these results, we can see that teams that made hits in the past tend to consecutively
create beneficial patents because those lines in Fig. 6 are above one, the average impact.
Since we can see a fall in repetitions without switching teams, the data fulfill Prediction
2.
The grayish lines in Fig. 6 show the average impact of the first patents applied for
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Figure 6. Average impact of patents following hits. We define hits as patents with top
10% impact. Horizontal axis is number of patents including a hit and all subsequent
patents by the same team that made the hit. The hit is not necessarily the team’s first
patent. Vertical axis is average impact. Horizontal axis is cut so that number of samples
is greater than approximately 100. Red, grayish red, blue, and grayish blue lines
correspond to Japanese “no switch,” Japanese “switch to new team,” U.S.’s “no switch,”
and U.S.’s “switch to new team.” Brackets show standard errors. Black horizontal line
is impact = 1.
by a new team. The grayish red line is for Japan, and the grayish blue line is for the
U.S. (“switch to new team”). The new team includes individuals who belonged to teams
that made hits. Since only the first patents with new teams are considered, repetitions
for “switch to new team” given by the horizontal axis have a different meaning from “no
switch.” Here, we want to compare the difference between “no switch” and “switch to
new team.” If a member belonged to a team (with a hit) until repetition r − 1 and then
switched to a new team, the impact of the first patent of the new team is plotted at r.
By doing so, we can compare the average impact of the repetition r of “no switch” with
the average impact of the first patents of the team to which the member switched.
Comparing the lines between no switching and switching enables us to understand
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when individuals should switch teams. We conduct the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests
between no switching and switching to see when the average impacts of switching are
significantly dominant over no switching. As mentioned earlier, the reason we choose
the Wilcoxon rank-sum test is that the impact distribution is highly skewed. The test is
one-sided. We found that switching is statistically dominant at and after the third
patents at the five percent level in the Japanese data. The tipping point for the U.S. is
the fifth patent. It should be noted that since samples sizes are not large enough after a
lot of repetitions, we cannot stably see the significance after the 11th patent for Japan
and the 12th patent for the U.S. As a result, individuals should seemingly switch teams
after the second patent following a hit in teams for Japanese patents and after the
fourth patent for U.S. patents. The data satisfy Prediction 3 based on this discussion.
To clearly see the effect of switching and discuss Prediction 3, let us define a
measure, ρr.
ρr ≡ Average impact of first patents created in new teams after (r-1)-th patentsAverage impact of r-th patents in teams .
If ρr is greater than one, the expectation of impact with the new teams is larger
than the r-th patents in current teams. Fig. 7 plots the ρr for each dataset. Note that
the plots are teams that had a hit, which is the same as Fig. 6. The horizontal axis
means r-th patents after hits in teams. The definition of the repetition number is
consistent with Fig. 6. The vertical axis means ρr. The black horizontal line is ρr = 1.
As subsequent patents continue to be filed, ρrs increase monotonically. As was already
pointed out, ρr seems to surpass 1 at the third patent of teams (the second patent after
hits) for Japanese patents. The transit point for U.S. patents is five (the fourth patent
after hits).
It is natural that the line of ρr is dependent on the threshold of a hit. We have set
the threshold at top 10% so far for simplicity. We show lines of ρr with different
thresholds in Fig. 8. There are four lines, each with a different threshold, shown for
both Japan and the U.S. These thresholds are “greater than 2,” “greater than 4,”
“greater than 8,” and “greater than 16” in impact (note that “greater than 2” is roughly
equivalent with the threshold for the top 10%). As is indicated in Fig. 8, we do not find
significant difference between thresholds in Japanese data. However, it seems that the
higher the threshold of hit is, the lower the ρr is in the U.S. data. We conduct the
Wilcoxon rank-sum tests between “greater than 2” and “greater than 16” for every
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Figure 7. Relationship between ρr and repetition. Horizontal axis is number of patents
including a hit and all subsequent patents by the same team that made the hit. Vertical
axis is ratio (ρr). Hits are patents with top 10% impact. Horizontal axis is cut so that
number of samples is greater than approximately 100. Black horizontal line is ρr = 1.
repetition as a typical example. We find that ρr for “greater than 16” is significantly
lower than that for “greater than 2.” We can say it is reasonable in the U.S. for people
to postpone moving into a new team on the basis of the extent of impact.
Since all predictions were confirmed, we can say we have quantitatively
demonstrated the dilemma of inventors, which has not been done before.
We have not discussed other possible variables that can be used instead of repetition
thus far. Possible variables include the age of inventors, the number of team patents,
and the number of technology classes that a team took. All these variables are related
to team experience. We already investigated these variables and found that repetition
and age are significantly related to the impact of patents [15]. Although repetition and
age are also correlated, we also found that each variable separately affects the impact.
Therefore, we can say repetition is a potent determinant of the impact of team patents.
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Figure 8. Effect on ρr of hit threshold. Horizontal axis is number of patents including
a hit and all subsequent patents by the same team that made the hit. Vertical axis is
ratio (ρr). There are four different thresholds of hits in this figure: greater than 2, 4, 8,
and 16 in impact. Black horizontal line is ρ = 1.
Prevention of degeneration
In the previous section, we explained that the creativity of teams declines on average,
and therefore, there is a dilemma for inventors as to whether to repeat or to switch
teams. Since switching teams involves the cost of communication needed to build a new
relationship and runs the risk of project failure, alleviating degeneration in repeat
collaborations can help inventors. Here, we propose two strategies to do so.
The first strategy is developing technological diversity. Fig. 9 plots results with
patents separated into two groups: inexperienced and experienced with technologies. If
a patent at some repetition number has a technology that a team has no experience
with, it is categorized into “inexperienced with technology.” Otherwise it is categorized
into “experienced with technology.” The repetition number means the number of
patents applied for by the same teams. The plots include all teams regardless of
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whether patents are hits or not, though we have discussed teams with hits thus far.
Since the results we show here are not limited to teams with hits, the prevention
strategies can be broadly applied to all teams. The results reveal that repetitions in the
inexperienced category are better than those in the experienced category. Moreover,
decline itself does not occur in Japanese patent data.
Figure 9. Average impact of repeat collaborations categorized by technological
development. Horizontal axis is repetitions of team patents. Vertical axis is average
impact. Brackets show standard errors. “Inexperienced with technology” (InEx) means
patents using technologies that teams have no experience with. “Experienced with
technology” (Ex) means the opposite. Horizontal axis is cut so that number of samples
is greater than approximately 100. Black horizontal line is impact = 1.
We conduct the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests between inexperienced and experienced
with technology. We find that inexperienced is statistically dominant at the five percent
level at every repetition in both the Japanese and U.S. data. Note that since there are
not large enough sample sizes after a lot of repetitions, we cannot stably see the
significance after the ninth patent for Japan and the 33rd patent for the U.S. The
standard errors in Fig. 9 look large at the bin of the 16th repetition. This is because
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the bin is calculated for 9-16 repetitions. Standard errors for every repetition is smaller
than those in Fig. 9. We can say that, to avoid decline, a team should incorporate a
new technological field that they have no experience with where possible.
The second strategy is developing inventor diversity. The definition of repeat
collaborations thus far has been consecutive patents that have been published by the
same team. We cannot count repeat collaborations with inventor diversity, that is to
say, mixing teams, by using the original definition because if an inventor is different
between two teams, these are considered as different teams. Therefore, we need to
redefine repeat collaborations to discuss this strategy. We define repeat collaborations
in another way on the basis of pairs of inventors. Regardless of other inventors in
collaborations, repetitions are counted if two particular inventors are involved. For
example, if there is a series of collaborations with inventors, such as inventors A, B, and
C, and inventors A, B, and D, there are two repeat collaborations for inventors A and B
but only one repeat collaboration for other pairs of inventors. On the basis of the
definition, we can consider the entrance and exit of other inventors in teams involving
two specific inventors. Fig. 10 plots the results. There are two groups of results:
inexperienced and experienced team setups. If a patent involves two inventors and they
have not experienced a team setup [other teammate(s)] before, the patent is categorized
into an inexperienced team setup and vice versa. The repetition number means the
number of patents applied for by the same pair of inventors. The plots include all
patents by pairs regardless of whether patents are hits or not. The results reveal that
repeats with inexperienced team setups are better than those with experienced team
setups. Moreover, decline itself is highly mitigated in Japanese patent data.
We again conduct the Wilcoxon rank-sum tests between inexperienced and
experienced team setups. The inexperienced team setup is statistically dominant at the
five percent level at every repetition in both the Japanese and U.S. data. It must be
noted again that there are not large enough sample sizes after a lot of repetitions. We
cannot stably see the significance after the 46th patent for Japan and the 30th patent
for the U.S. Therefore, we can say that changing a team setup where possible is always
a good strategy to prevent degeneration. Guimera` et al.’s seminal work [14] showed
repetitions negatively affect overall performance. It can be said that our study adds new
findings to their work in the sense that changing a team setup causes a positive result at
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Figure 10. Average impact of repeat collaborations categorized by development of
team members. Horizontal axis is repetitions by inventor pairs. Vertical axis is average
impact. Brackets show standard errors. “Inexperienced team setup” (InEx) means some
members other than target pairs enter or exit. “Experienced team setup” (Ex) means
the opposite. Horizontal axis is cut so that number of samples is greater than
approximately 100. Black horizontal line is impact = 1.
every step of repetition.
The two analyses, technological diversity and inventor diversity, cannot be compared
simply because their definitions of teams are different. Even so, if we look at the gaps
and the size of the error bars between the experienced and the inexperienced teams, it
would be plausible that mixing a team is more secure than learning a new technology
with an existing team because the relative size of the gaps in the standard errors of
inventor diversity looks larger than those of technological diversity.
The dilemma of innovation comes from the contradiction that we need to exploit our
previously obtained resources, including shared knowledge and team coordination, and
simultaneously need to explore new solutions that have not been created yet. From the
viewpoint of exploitation, it is easily imagined that teams will maximize the utility of
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their resources and achieve inventions that gradually degenerate. Therefore, it is
straightforward to give stimuli or perturbations to teams to expand their resources.
However, trying a whole new field of technologies and entirely destroying team
coordination eliminate the merit of exploiting. Our two analyses done to show the effect
of trying new technologies and new team setups are evidence that there seem to be
approaches to tackling the dilemma, especially when we carefully look into the situation
of knowledge sharing and team coordination. In line with the discussion, a preceding
experimental study indicated that mixed teams are more adaptive than intact teams in
the sense that the former explores the space of solutions without any intervention [22].
Also, another study revealed that mixed teams are more promising than intact teams if
retention intervals are long [23]. Studying the innovator’s dilemma with massive data
has only just begun, and there is a lot of room to further discuss tackling the dilemma.
Furthermore, as an implication of this study, we discuss the applicability of our
findings to other types of data. We discussed repetitions of inventor groups and their
dilemma in this study. Since no matter what a group is, its aim is to achieve better
performance, we will probably observe the dilemma between routines and dysfunction
when a group does not adapt itself to situational changes. There are preceding studies
that discussed routines in groups in other contexts, including political
decision-making [28], research and development projects [29], or controlling uninhabited
aerial vehicles [22,23]. Since we can probably define routines and dysfunctions in these
groups, we can expect that the dilemma, i.e. when or how to mitigate dysfunction, can
be studied on the basis of the framework we proposed in this paper.
Conclusion
We focused on repeat collaborations in creative projects and how they affect
performance. Repeat collaborations have two contradictory aspects. The first is a
positive aspect: team development or experience. The second is negative: team
degeneration or decline. This dilemma has not previously been quantitatively analyzed.
We provided extensive and quantitative analyses of the dilemma with creative projects
by using patent data from Japan and the United States.
We proposed three predictions to validate the dilemma. Prediction 1 is that the
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greater the patent a team achieves, the longer the team will work together. Prediction 2
is that the impact of consecutive patents decreases after a team makes hits. Prediction
3 is that the expectation of impact by switching teams is greater than that from
consecutively working in the same team at some point during subsequent patents. We
found these predictions are validated on the basis of the data.
We then proposed preventive strategies against degeneration. One is developing
technological diversity, and another is developing inventor diversity. We found the two
strategies are both effective by validating them on the basis of the data.
We studied the relationship between the repetition of collaborations and
performance. However, retention between repetitions is not constant, and the diversity
of the retention can affect the performance. A precedent study discussed this from the
viewpoint of changing team memberships, which is the same approach as our study, in a
controlled environment [23]. A complementary study with our data on the retention can
be potential future work.
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